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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
 	  	  	  
—INTRODUCTION In	  this	  essay	  I	  want	  to	  try	  and	  accomplish	  two	  things.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  revisit	  Raymond	  Williams’s	   notion	   of	   ‘structures	   of	   feeling’	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   clarifying	   what	  Williams	  meant	  by	  ‘feelings’,	  and	  of	  exploring	  the	  concept’s	  possible	  range	  and	  reach	  within	   the	   study	   of	   culture.	   In	   the	  midst	   of	   the	   enthusiastic	   championing	   of	  what	  Patricia	  Clough	  and	  others	  have	  named	   ‘the	  affective	   turn’	   in	   the	  human	  and	  post-­‐human	   sciences	   it	   might	   be	   an	   opportune	  moment	   to	   return	   to	   this	   foundational	  (though	   often	   criticised)	   concept	   within	   cultural	   studies	   to	   see	   what	   it	   can	  productively	  offer	  cultural	  investigation	  and	  how	  it	  might	  inflect	  and	  accentuate	  the	  current	  and	  diverse	  interests	  in	  affect.1	  The	  second	  goal	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  while	  the	  analysis	  of	   ‘structures	  of	   feeling’	  has	  been	  deployed	  primarily	   in	  studies	  of	   literary	  and	   filmic	   culture	   it	   might	   be	   usefully	   extended	   towards	   the	   study	   of	   more	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ubiquitous	  forms	  of	  material	  culture	  such	  as	  clothing,	  housing,	  food,	  furnishings	  and	  other	  material	  practices	  of	  daily	  living.	  Indeed	  it	  might	  be	  one	  way	  of	  explaining	  how	  formations	  of	   feeling	  are	  disseminated,	  how	  they	  suture	  us	  to	  the	  social	  world	  and	  how	   feelings	   are	   embedded	   in	   the	   accoutrements	   of	   domestic,	   habitual	   life.	   The	  joining	   together	   of	   a	   socially	   phenomenological	   interest	   in	   the	   world	   of	   things,	  accompanied	   by	   an	   attention	   to	   historically	   specific	  moods	   and	   atmospheres,	   is,	   I	  think,	   a	   way	   of	  mobilising	   the	   critical	   potential	   of	   ‘structures	   of	   feelings’	   towards	  important	  mundane	  cultural	  phenomena.	  Informing	  these	  two	  aims	  is	  a	  much	  larger	  project	  that	  is	  the	  deep	  background	  for	  this	  essay.	   In	  trying	  to	  describe	  and	  chart	  changes	   in	  postwar	  British	  society	  at	  the	  level	  of	  everyday	  life	  (changes	  that	  could	  be	  described	  with	  a	  very	  broad	  brush	  as	  the	  journey	  from	  a	  welfare	  state	  consensus	  to	  what	  will	  become	  neoliberalism)	  I	  want	  to	  reserve	  a	  place	  for	  feelings	  and	  tastes	  as	  historical	  agents	  (rather	  than	  just	  as	  symptoms	  of	  more	  fundamental	  historical	  processes).2	  Seeing	  feelings	  and	  tastes	  as	   agents	   of	   history	   and	  as	   form-­‐giving	   social	   forces	  means	  having	   to	  depart	   from	  the	   insistent	  de-­‐materialising	  of	   the	   sensorial	   aspect	   of	   these	   terms.	  By	   reminding	  ourselves	   that	   ‘feeling’	   is	   related	   to	   a	   world	   of	   touch,	   to	   a	   sensual	   world	   that	   is	  fabricated	  out	  of	  wood,	   steel,	   denim,	   crushed-­‐velvet	   and	   tarmac,	   and	   that	   ‘taste’	   is	  connected	   to	   a	   world	   that	   is	   ingested,	   that	   triggers	   olfactory	   and	   gustatory	  sensations,	   I	   hope	   to	   push	   social	   and	   cultural	   history	   towards	   an	   attention	   to	  changes	  in	  the	  hum-­‐drum	  material	  world	  of	  carpets	  and	  curries,	  beanbags	  and	  bean	  sprouts.	  My	   intuition	   and	  my	  gamble	   is	   that	   the	   felt	  world	   is	   often	   experienced	   in	  something	   like	   a	   synaesthetic	   mode	   where	   feelings	   of	   social	   flourishing	   and	  struggling	   take	   on	   particular	   flavours,	   sounds,	   colour-­‐schemes	   and	   smells;	   where	  hope	   and	   nostalgia,	   melancholy	   and	   exuberance	   have	   sensual	   forms	   that	   are	  sometimes	   durable	   and	   sometimes	   fleeting.	   Such	   structures	   of	   feeling	  might	   have	  particular	  sensorial	  amalgams	  such	  that	  a	  particular	  mood	  of	  optimism	  comes	  with	  textures,	   fragrances	  and	  soundscapes;	  or	  an	  atmosphere	  of	   low-­‐level	  anxiety	  has	  a	  colour-­‐scheme,	  an	  aroma	  and	  a	  tactility.	  This,	  I	  hope,	  is	  to	  inject	  historicity	  into	  what	  is	  now	  a	  slightly	  old-­‐fashioned	  term—‘lifestyle’.3	  Treating	   feeling	   and	   taste	   as	   historical	   agents	   also	   requires	   apprehending	  ‘fashion’	  (the	  engine	  of	  lifestyle)	  as	  process:	  fashion	  is	  not	  an	  accomplished	  fact	  that	  characterises	   an	   epoch	   or	   a	   group,	   rather	   it	   is	   the	   ongoing	   process	   of	   worlding,	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where	   history	   is	   seen	   as	   continual	   fashioning	   and	   re-­‐fashioning.	   (Just	   to	   be	   clear	  here,	  by	  fashion	  and	  lifestyle	  I	  don’t	  mean	  ‘being	  in-­‐fashion’	  or	  the	  world	  of	  ‘designer	  brands’	   but	   the	   ubiquitous	   process	   that	   we	   all	   undertake,	   albeit	   with	   radically	  different	  resources,	  of	  fashioning	  worlds	  with	  whatever	  is	  to	  hand.)	  To	  treat	  fashion	  and	  lifestyle	  seriously	  is,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest,	  one	  way	  of	  overcoming	  the	  inflexibility	  of	  a	  system	  of	  social	  classification	  inherited	  from	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Fashions,	  and	  the	   feelings	   and	   tastes	   that	   drive	   them,	   are	   not	   evenly	   spread	   across	   society.	  Fashions	   and	   fashioning	   shape	   what	   it	   is	   to	   feel	   young	   and	   old;	   to	   feel	   part	   of	   a	  group,	  part	  of	  a	  social	  and	  ethnic	  class;	  they	  articulate	  modes	  of	  identity	  and	  forms	  of	  dis-­‐identification;	  and	  they	  render	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  as	  a	  form	  of	  visibility	  and	  as	   shared	   sets	   of	   sensitivities.	   Trying	   to	   describe	   the	   experience	   and	   histories	   of	  class	   (as	   something	   lived	   in	   endlessly	   subtle	   and	   sensorial	   forms)	   through	   a	  classificatory	   system	   based	   on	   a	   highly	   limited	   taxonomy	   (working,	   middle	   and	  upper,	   for	   instance)	   blunts	   historical	   investigation.	   To	   my	   mind	   treating	   fashions	  (mundane	  as	  well	  as	  spectacular)	  as	  having	  historical	  agency	  is	  a	  way	  of	  providing	  more	  socially	  nuanced	  and	  historically	  sensitive	  figurations	  of	  social	  class	  and	  other	  forms	   of	   hierarchical	   organisation.	   The	   political	   value	   of	   maintaining	   a	   view	   of	  history	   as	   class	   struggle	   (as	   a	   struggle	   between	   the	   owners	   of	   the	   means	   of	  production	   and	   the	   workforce)	   gets	   lost	   if	   we	   can’t	   also	   see	   the	   way	   that	   those	  struggles	  are	  refashioned	  as	  fewer	  people	  own	  the	  means	  of	  production,	  while	  more	  and	  more	  people	   feel	  as	   though	  they	  own	  property,	  even	   if	   that	   feeling	  also	  has	   to	  reside	  in	  a	  monthly	  payment	  to	  the	  bank	  or	  building	  society	  (who,	  of	  course,	  are	  the	  real	   owners).	   Similarly,	   feelings	   of	   youth,	   of	   being	   modern	   and	   current,	   or	  alternatively	   of	   feeling	   ‘passed-­‐it’	   or	   out	   of	   time,	   animate	   and	   complicate	   class	  experience	   and	   can	   also,	   at	   times,	   significantly	   refashion	   it.	   My	   claim	   is	   that	  ‘structures	   of	   feeling’	   can	   help	   provide	   more	   vivid	   historical	   renderings	   of	   social	  experience	   by	   allowing	   sensorial	   ‘worlds’	   to	   appear	   as	   inhabited	   by	   singularly	  distinct	  historical	  subjects.	  ‘Structures	  of	  feeling’,	  I	  want	  to	  claim,	  allows	  us	  access	  to	  the	  way	  feelings	  and	  tastes	  are	  an	  activity	  of	   ‘worlding’	  that	  renders	  life	  as	  this	   life	  and	  not	  another,	  and	  renders	  time	  as	  this	  time	  and	  not	  another.	  My	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  recruit	  Williams	  and	  his	  suggestive	   phrase	   to	   the	   cadre	   and	   armoury	   of	   affect	   theorists	   and	   their	   lexicons.	  Nor	  do	  I	  want	  to	  use	  Williams	  to	  make	  a	  decisive	  intervention	  in	  debates	  within	  the	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dense	  and	  multiple	   fields	  of	  affect	   theory.4	  My	   intention	   is	  rather	  to	  use	  Williams’s	  problematic	   and	   productive	   phrase	   to	   conjoin	   an	   attention	   to	   cultural	   feelings	  (atmospherics,	   moods,	   manners,	   attitudes,	   orientations,	   and	   so	   on—an	   attention	  that	  might	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  affect	  theorists)	  with	  the	  study	  of	  the	  materiality	  of	  the	  designed	   world,	   in	   the	   name	   of	   cultural	   historicity,	   particularly	   the	   historicity	   of	  changes	   in	  everyday	   life	  during	   the	   last	   fifty	  or	   so	  years.	  What	   follows	   is	  an	   initial	  down	  payment	  on	  trying	  to	  substantiate	  this	  claim.	  
—STRUCTURES OF FEELING During	  the	  thirty	  odd	  years	  that	  Raymond	  Williams	  deployed	  the	  term	  ‘structures	  of	  feeling’,	  it	  could	  point	  to	  an	  entity	  as	  vast	  as	  the	  dominant	  feelings	  of	  an	  age	  (of	  the	  Elizabethan	  age,	  for	  instance)	  or	  as	  historically	  specific	  as	  an	  emergent	  (or	  even	  pre-­‐emergent)	  set	  of	  concerns	  coming	  into	  focus	  for	  specific	  groups	  (for	  instance	  in	  the	  new	   social	   movements	   of	   the	   1980s	   and	   beyond).	   ‘Feelings’	   could	   at	   times	   be	  covered	  by	  the	  word	   ‘experience’	  and	  would	  include	  a	  massive	  terrain	  of	  attitudes,	  manners,	   actions,	   behaviours	   and	   so	   on.	   ‘Structure’	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   word	   that	   is	  primarily	  used	  to	  suggest	  a	  commonality,	  a	  series	  of	  relations	  and	  repetitions,	  a	  way	  of	  insisting	  that	  ‘feelings’	  aren’t	  the	  private	  property	  of	  an	  individual	  but	  are	  part	  of	  a	  common	  social	  culture.	  Neither	  ‘structure’	  nor	  ‘feeling’	  has	  any	  inherent	  specificity	  in	  this	  context;	  and	  their	  combination	  hardly	  clarifies	  matters.	  To	  say	  that	  the	  term	  is	  vague,	  should,	  I	  think,	  be	  obvious.	  The	  more	  important	  question	  might	  well	  be:	  is	  it	  necessarily	  vague?	  Does	  the	  vagueness	  of	  the	  term	  allow	  it	  to	  do	  the	  sort	  of	  work	  that	  a	  more	  precise	  term	  would	  inhibit?	  The	  features	  of	  the	  phrase	  that	  require	  more	  clarification	  are	  not,	  I	  don’t	  think,	  the	   temporal	   or	   spatial	   units	   that	   can	   be	   described	   by	   it	   (local,	   identity-­‐specific,	  national	  or	  international;	  the	  longue	  durée	  of	  an	  epoch,	  or	  the	  relatively	  short	  time-­‐span	  of	  economic	  booms	  and	  busts,	  for	  instance).	  In	  this	  ‘structures	  of	  feeling’	  is	  an	  abstraction,	   just	   like	   ‘culture’;	   it	   is	   fundamentally	   tensile	   in	  quality	  and	  will	  always	  require	  clarification	  as	  it	  tries	  to	  apprehend	  the	  empirical.	  As	  Paul	  Filmer	  suggests:	  ‘as	   with	   any	   concept	   formulated	   to	   assist	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   emergent	   flux	   of	  social	   process,	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   require	   clarification	   whenever	   it	   is	   introduced	   into	  critical	   discourse	   and	   whenever	   it	   is	   applied	   to	   the	   critical	   analysis	   of	   concrete,	  empirical	   social	   and	   cultural	   practices’.5	   Indeed	   one	   way	   of	   thinking	   about	   the	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critical	   lexicon	   that	  Williams	   produced	   during	   his	   career	   is	   that	   it	  was	   principally	  aimed	  at	  providing	  just	  such	  tools	  for	  clarification.	  So	  the	  finely	  wrought	  distinctions	  between	   ‘oppositional’,	   ‘alternative’	   and	   ‘incorporated’,	   and	   the	   dynamic	   temporal	  situation	  that	  the	  terms	  ‘emergent’,	  ‘residual’	  and	  ‘dominant’	  point	  to,	  are	  all	  ways	  of	  clarifying	  and	  qualifying	  formations	  of	  feelings.6	  To	  my	  mind	  the	  features	  of	  the	  term	  that	  would	  benefit	   from	  more	  discussion	  (and	  the	  ones	  that	  I	  will	  concentrate	  on	  in	  this	  essay)	  are,	  firstly,	  the	  anthropological	  context	   for	   the	   invention	   and	   deployment	   of	   the	   term,	   and,	   secondly,	   the	   cultural	  forms	  and	  materials	  that	  are	  seen	  as	  conveying	  ‘feelings’.	  The	  detailing	  of	  the	  direct	  and	   indirect	   influence	   of	   anthropological	   theory	   on	   Williams’s	   conception	   of	  ‘structures	  of	   feeling’	  allows,	   I	   think,	   for	  a	  much	   fuller	  discussion	  of	  what	  Williams	  meant	  by	  ‘feeling’	  and	  the	  sorts	  of	  qualities	  and	  phenomena	  that	  could	  be	  referred	  to	  by	   that	   term.	   I	  also	   think	   that	  because	  Williams	  was	  professionally	  a	   literary	  critic	  and	  literary	  historian,	  the	  emphasis	  in	  his	  books	  is	  often	  necessarily	  on	  the	  way	  that	  literature	   (particularly	   drama)	   can	   offer	   evidence	   of	   structures	   of	   feeling.	   Yet	  throughout	   his	  writing,	   particularly	   at	  moments	   of	   autobiographical	   performance,	  there	  are	  clear	  indications	  that	  he	  saw	  structures	  of	  feelings	  as	  being	  conveyed	  and	  sustained	   by	  much	   less	   representational	   forms;	   conveyed	   and	   sustained	   by	   forms	  that	   have	   a	   ubiquitous	   presence	   within	   the	   everyday,	   for	   instance	   clothing,	  buildings,	  and	  for	  many,	  religion.	  	  	  	  The	   phrase	   ‘structures	   of	   feeling’	   was	   first	   used	   by	   Williams	   in	   1954	   in	   his	  jointly	  authored	  book	  (with	  the	  documentary	  filmmaker	  Michael	  Orrom)	  Preface	  to	  
Film.7	  In	  this	  book	  he	  coins	  the	  phrase	  as	  a	  way	  of	  holding	  together	  an	  argument	  that	  insists	   that	   dramatic	   forms	   are	   recognised	   as	   part	   of	   a	   social	   totality,	   and	   as	  providing	   the	  most	   vivid	   evidence	  of	  what	   that	   totality	   is	   like	   as	   a	   living	   form	   (its	  qualities	   or	   attitudes,	   for	   instance).	   While	   cultural	   historians	   and	   literary	   critics	  might	  seek	  to	  grasp	  the	  world	  as	  divided	  up	  into	  separate	  entities	  (religion,	  leisure,	  family,	  politics,	  and	  so	  on)	  this	  is	  not	  how	  the	  world	  is	  experienced:	  ‘while	  we	  may,	  in	  the	  study	  of	  a	  past	  period,	  separate	  out	  particular	  aspects	  of	  life,	  and	  treat	  them	  as	  if	   they	  were	  self-­‐contained,	   it	   is	  obvious	  that	  this	   is	  only	  how	  they	  may	  be	  studied,	  not	   how	   they	  were	   experienced’.8	   This	   is	   an	   issue	   that	   the	  historian	   faces.	   It	   is	   an	  argument	   against	   the	   atomising	   effects	   of	   disciplinary	   specialisation	   (the	  specialisations	   that	   produce	   separate	   realms	   of	   economic	   history,	   social	   history,	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political	  history	  and	  cultural	  history,	  for	  instance).	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  use	  an	  analogy	  that	  he	  will	   return	   to	   each	   time	   he	   discusses	   ‘structures	   of	   feeling’:	   ‘We	   examine	   each	  element	  as	  a	  precipitate,	  but	  in	  the	  living	  experience	  of	  the	  time	  every	  element	  was	  in	  solution,	  an	  inseparable	  part	  of	  a	  complex	  whole’.9	  Initially	  the	  phrase	  is	  used	  to	  encourage	   a	   particular	   form	   of	   attention	   towards	   dramatic	   works.	   Its	   aim	   is	   to	  transform	   finished	   artworks,	   that	  might	   be	   available	   for	   specialised	   and	   atomised	  interpretation,	   into	   unfinished,	   socially	   responsive	  works,	   that	   are	   ‘still’	   emerging	  within	   the	  melange	  of	   a	  dynamic	   culture,	   and	   that	   rather	   than	   requiring	   specialist	  interpretation,	  require	  understanding,	  contextualising	  and	  connecting.	  The	  phrase	  is	  intended	   to	   direct	   our	   attention	   towards	   the	   work’s	   historicity;	   its	   role	   as	  documentary	   evidence	   of	   ‘the	   native’s	   point	   of	   view’	   (so	   to	   say),	   for	   a	   particular	  community,	  at	  a	  particular	  time.	  ‘Structures	   of	   feelings’	   are,	   for	   Williams,	   what	   get	   remaindered	   when	  professionalised	  specialists	  get	  their	  hands	  on	  culture	  and	  divide	  it	  up	  into	  distinct	  realms	  of	   ‘psychology’,	   ‘society’,	   ‘economy’,	   ‘history’,	   ‘art’	  and	  so	  on.	   ‘When	  one	  has	  measured	  the	  work	  against	  the	  separable	  parts’,	  writes	  Williams,	  ‘there	  yet	  remains	  some	  element	  for	  which	  there	  is	  no	  external	  counterpart.	  This	  element,	  I	  believe,	  is	  what	   I	   have	   named	   the	   structure	   of	   feeling	   of	   a	   period,	   and	   it	   is	   only	   realizable	  through	   experience	   of	   the	  work	   of	   art	   itself,	   as	   a	  whole.’10	  We	   should	   be	  wary	   of	  thinking,	  however,	   that	   this	  means	  we	  can	  only	   recover	  structures	  of	   feelings	   from	  artworks:	  the	  emphasis	  of	  the	  ‘only’	  might	  not	  refer	  to	  ‘art’	  so	  much	  as	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  experiencing	  it	  as	  a	  ‘whole’	  (as	  a	  whole	  way	  of	  life,	  as	  a	  world).	  Such	  emphasis	  seems	  to	  be	  clarified	  when	  he	  writes,	   ‘all	  changes	  in	  the	  methods	  of	  an	  art	   like	  drama	  are	  related,	  essentially,	  to	  changes	  in	  man’s	  radical	  structure	  of	  feeling’.11	  Thus	  while	  art	  (film,	   plays	   and	   novels,	   primarily)	   might	   be	   the	   privileged	   documentary	   route	   to	  recovering	   a	   structure	   of	   feeling,	   it	   is	   human,	   ‘lived	   experience’—as	   an	   entirety—where	  structures	  of	  feeling	  exist.12	  As	  such	  structures	  of	  feeling	  are	  not	  an	  aspect	  of	  life	   (or	   art)	   that	   can	   be	   siphoned-­‐off	   and	   analysed;	   they	   saturate	   the	   lifeworld	   in	  complex	  ways,	  as	  mood,	  attitude,	  manners,	  emotions,	  and	  so	  on.	  Anyone	   even	   slightly	   familiar	   with	   Williams’s	   work	   will	   recognise	   that	  ‘structures	  of	  feeling’	  echoes	  with	  his	  emphasis	  on	  treating	  culture	  as	  a	  ‘whole	  way	  of	  life’.13	  ‘A	  whole	  way	  of	  life’	  is	  Williams’s	  way	  of	  signalling	  that	  culture	  needs	  to	  be	  seen	   through	   the	   transdisciplinary	   optic	   of	   anthropology.	   And	   it	   becomes	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increasingly	   clear	   in	  Williams’s	   work	   that	   it	   is	   specifically	   the	   contribution	   of	   the	  North	  American	  anthropologist	  Ruth	  Benedict	  and	  her	  1934	  book	  Patterns	  of	  Culture	  that	  supplies	   the	  relevant	  method.	  Thus	   in	  an	  essay	   from	  1950	  addressed	  to	  other	  teachers	  working	  in	  adult	  education	  Williams	  is	  emphatic	  in	  his	  recommendation	  of	  foundational	  ‘supplementary’	  reading	  for	  approaching	  literature	  and	  criticism:	  There	  is	  one	  book	  among	  many	  works	  of	  anthropology	  which	  seems	  to	  me	  so	  distinguished	  that	  it	  cannot	  wisely	  be	  omitted	  from	  an	  essential	  reading	  list	  in	  this	  field;	  Ruth	  Benedict’s	  Patterns	  of	  Culture.	  Her	  book	  provides	  the	  method	  of	   comparative	   social	   evaluation	  which	   is	  necessary	  both	   to	   give	  the	  work	  of	  cultural	  analysis	  full	  scope	  and	  to	  keep	  it	  relevant.14	  Williams’s	  work	  is	  full	  of	  explicit	  reference	  to	  Benedict,	  and	  his	  adoption	  of	  ‘pattern’	  as	  an	  analytic	  term	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  Benedict’s	  anthropological	  concerns.	  In	  his	  1961	   book	   The	   Long	   Revolution,	   Williams	   claims	   that	   some	   form	   of	   pattern	  recognition	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  cultural	  analysis:	  It	  is	  with	  the	  discovery	  of	  patterns	  of	  a	  characteristic	  kind	  that	  any	  useful	  cultural	   analysis	   begins,	   and	   it	   is	   with	   the	   relationships	   between	   these	  patterns,	   which	   sometimes	   reveal	   unexpected	   identities	   and	  correspondences	   in	   hitherto	   separately	   considered	   activities,	   sometimes	  again	   reveal	   discontinuities	   of	   an	   unexpected	   kind,	   that	   general	   cultural	  analysis	  is	  concerned.15	  
The	   Long	   Revolution	   offers	   two	   analyses	   of	   structures	   of	   feelings.	   The	   first	   is	  concerned	   with	   the	   literature	   of	   the	   1840s	   and	   in	   the	   way	   that	   attitudes	   and	  behaviours	  towards	  the	  poor	  are	  articulated	  in	  the	  novels	  of	  the	  period,	  the	  second	  is	   concerned	  with	   ‘Britain	   in	   the	  1960s’	   (the	  book	  was	  written	   in	  1959)	   and	   is	   an	  attempt	   to	   extrapolate	   changing	   structures	   of	   feeling	   in	   Britain	   within	   social	  institutions	   (schools,	   universities,	   trade	   unions,	   political	   parties,	   and	   such	   like),	  within	  work	  relations	  (the	  rise	  of	  managerialism,	  for	  instance)	  and	  within	  everyday	  life	  (the	  extension	  of	  consumerism,	  the	  growth	  of	  media	  consumption,	  and	  so	  on).	  I	  will	   return	   to	   this	   analysis	   later,	   for	   the	   moment	   I	   want	   to	   give	   a	   sense	   of	   the	  descriptive	   language	  that	  Williams	  employs	   in	   these	  and	  other	  analyses.16	   In	  many	  ways	  it	  could	  be	  described	  as	  ‘social	  formalism’:	  thus,	  he	  isn’t	  necessarily	  concerned	  with	   the	  explicit	  content	  of	  an	  argument,	  but	   in	   its	   ‘approaches	  and	   tones’	   (indeed	  ‘tone’	  is	  an	  insistent	  descriptor	  in	  Williams’s	  approach).	  Some	  of	  the	  ‘feeling’	  words	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connect	  to	  behavioural	  attitudes	  (‘thrift’,	  ‘sobriety’,	  ‘piety’,	  ‘pathos’	  and	  so	  on).	  Other	  words	  connect	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  tempo	  of	  change	  and	  the	  orchestration	  of	  energies	  (‘pulse’,	   ‘rhythm’).	   And	   some	   words	   suggest,	   metaphorically,	   some	   hard-­‐to-­‐pin-­‐down	  atmosphere	  or	  mood	  (‘colour’,	  ‘tone’).	  This	   vocabulary	   is	   close	   to	   the	   language	   that	   Benedict	   and	   her	   associates	  (primarily,	  in	  this	  instance,	  Gregory	  Bateson)	  used	  in	  their	  ‘pattern’	  analyses.	  In	  her	  work	  in	  the	  1930s	  Benedict	  sought	  a	  synthetic,	  comparative	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  culture	  that	  looked	  for	  particular	  configurations	  of	  what	  she	  called	  ‘the	  emotional	  background’	   of	   a	   culture	   in	   and	   across	   the	   observable	   rituals	   and	   forms	   of	  behaviour,	  which	  were	  the	  privileged	  phenomena	  for	  anthropological	  concern	  at	  the	  time.	  Culture,	  for	  Benedict,	  was	  a	  gestalt	  form	  that	  configured	  beliefs	  and	  behaviours	  against	  affective	  and	  emotional	  conditions	  and	  traditions	   that	  often	   lay	   ‘below’	   the	  declared	  content	  of	  a	  society.17	  This	  emotional	  background	  was	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  by	  Benedict	  as	  ‘ethos’;	  a	  term	  that	  was	  also	  deployed	  and	  elaborated	  by	  Bateson	  in	  his	  1936	  book	  Naven.18	  An	  ethos	  might	  include	  tacit	  understandings	  that	  allow	  a	  statement	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   joke	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   serious	   opinion;	   it	   might	  include	   shared	   sentiments	   that	  might	   be	   oblique	   or	   obscure	   to	   an	   outsider	   while	  requiring	   no	   reflexive	   attention	   on	   the	   part	   of	   an	   insider;	   it	   might	   signal	   those	  cultural	   forms	   that	   get	   called	   manners,	   mores	   or	   ‘appropriate’	   behaviour.	   In	  Benedict’s	  analyses	  the	  emotional	  background	  or	  ethos	  is	  pushed	  to	  the	  foreground	  and	  used	  to	  characterise	  a	  particular	  society:	   ‘I	  have	  called	   the	  ethos	  of	   the	  Pueblo	  Apollonian	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  sense	  of	  the	  cultural	  pursuit	  of	  sobriety,	  of	  measure,	  of	  the	  distrust	   of	   excess	   and	   orgy’.19	   Thus	   ‘ethos’	   was	   the	   ‘emotional	   patterning	  characteristic	   of	   the	   culture’	   and	  a	   crucial	   element	   in	   ‘fundamental	   and	  distinctive	  cultural	   configurations	   that	   pattern	   existence	   and	   condition	   the	   thoughts	   and	  emotions	  of	  the	  individuals	  who	  participate	  in	  those	  cultures’.20	  I	   will	   need	   to	   come	   back	   to	   how	   Benedict	   and	   Bateson	   understood	   ethos	   in	  relation	  to	  how	  Williams	  understood	  structures	  of	  feeling:	  there	  are	  discontinuities	  here	  as	  well	  as	  continuities.	  But	  what	   is	  of	  concern	  now	   is	   the	  way	   that	  emotional	  backgrounds	   and	   structures	   of	   feeling	   are	   seen	   as	   being	   conveyed	   and	   sustained	  within	  culture.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  are	  the	  vehicles	  for	  feelings	  in	  culture?	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—A SENSE OF THINGS One	  of	  the	  reasons,	  I	  think,	  for	  revisiting	  the	  link	  between	  anthropology	  and	  cultural	  studies,	   is	   that	   anthropology	   has	   never	   had	   a	   particular	   stake	   in	   privileging	   the	  complex	  representational	  forms	  that	  are	  often	  the	  mainstay	  of	  humanities	  research	  (novels,	  plays,	  commentaries)	  and	  which	  cultural	  studies	  inherited	  from	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  study	  of	  English	  literature,	  not	  least	  from	  Raymond	  Williams.	  For	  anthropology	  (or	  the	  type	  that	  Benedict	  and	  Bateson	  pursued,	  at	  least)	  ‘a	  whole	  way	  of	  life’	  is	  not	  just	  found	  in	  foundation	  myths,	  rituals	  or	  beliefs,	  or	  in	  cultural	  objects	  and	  practices	  but	   in	   the	  ways	   these	  exist	  within	   ‘functioning	  wholes’.	  Thus,	   for	  Benedict,	  objects	  and	  beliefs	  have	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  situ:	  	  We	  still	   know	   in	   reality	  exactly	  nothing	  about	   them	  [cultural	  objects	  and	  practices]	  unless	  we	  know	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  arrangement	  of	  the	  house,	  the	  articles	  of	  dress,	  the	  rules	  of	  avoidance	  or	  of	  marriage,	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  supernatural—how	   each	   object	   and	   culture	   trait,	   in	   other	   words,	   is	  employed	  in	  their	  native	  life.21	  	  Williams,	  of	   course,	   also	  maintained	   the	   importance	  of	   ‘a	  whole	  way	  of	   life’	   as	   the	  crucial	   context	   and	   ambition	   of	   any	   analysis.	   Yet	   while	   Benedict	   and	   Bateson	  undertook	  their	  fieldwork	  within	  living	  culture,	  Williams’s	  field	  was	  the	  long	  durée	  of	   industrialised	   change	   that	   stretched	   from	   the	   seventeenth	   century	   to	   the	   late	  twentieth.	   Because	   the	   analyses	   of	   structures	   of	   feeling	   are	   concerned	   with	   the	  historicity	   of	   experience	   they	   are	   in	   one	   important	   sense	   always	   grammatically	   in	  the	  present,	  even	   if	   that	  present	   is	   in	   the	  eighteenth	  century.22	  But	   this	  does	  mean	  that	  while	   the	   carriers	   of	   structures	   of	   feeling	  within	   a	   current	  moment	  might	   be	  informal	   and	   ephemeral	   culture,	   ‘carried’	   primarily	   by	   living	   (and	   unrecorded)	  speech	   and	   everyday	   social	   practice,	   this	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   recover	   when	   that	  moment	   is	   located	   in	   the	  past.	   ‘Once	   the	  carriers	  of	   such	  a	  structure	  die’,	  Williams	  wrote	  in	  The	  Long	  Revolution,	   ‘the	  nearest	  we	  can	  get	  to	  this	  vital	  element	  is	  in	  the	  documentary	   culture,	   from	   poems	   to	   buildings	   and	   dress-­‐fashion,	   and	   it	   is	   this	  relation	  that	  gives	  significance	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  culture	  in	  documentary	  terms.’23	  Quite	  rightly	  Williams	  is	  less	  remembered	  for	  his	  commentary	  on	  dress-­‐fashion	  and	  building	   than	  he	   is	   for	   his	   accounts	   of	   poetic	   and	  dramatic	   cultures.	   Yet	   there	   are	  telling	   moments	   within	   his	   work—often	   these	   are	   moments	   of	   autobiographical	  performance24—where	  description	  of	  dress,	  of	  places	  (the	  tea	  rooms	  of	  Cambridge,	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for	   instance),	   and	   the	   lives	   conducted	   within	   buildings	   (in	   chapels,	   factories,	  universities	  and	  railway	  signal	  boxes),	  combine	  feelings	  sustained	  in	  and	  by	  material	  forms	  with	  Williams	  providing	  testimony	  as	  a	   living	  witness	  and	  carrier	  of	  specific	  feelings.	  In	   a	   conversation	   conducted	   in	   1959	   between	  Williams	   and	   the	   literary	   and	  social	   critic	   Richard	   Hoggart,	   the	   pair	   discuss	   ‘working	   class	   attitudes’	   (and	  ‘attitudes’	   is	   very	  much	   a	   ‘structure	   of	   feeling’	  word),	   particularly	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  difference	   between	   the	   densely	   populated	   urban	   world	   of	   Leeds	   where	   Hoggart	  grew	  up	  (an	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  centre	  in	  northern	  England)	  and	  the	  Welsh	  village	  of	  Pandy	  where	  Williams	  lived.	  Williams	  describes	  how	  class	  feelings	  among	  labourers	   and	  miners	   in	  Wales	   didn’t	   take	   the	   form	  of	   a	   sense	   of	   inferiority.	   Such	  feelings	  were	  sustained	  not	  simply	  by	  self-­‐belief	  but	  by	  a	  whole	  panoply	  of	  material	  forms	  including	  clothing:	  I	   remember	   the	  men	   at	   home—a	  whole	   attitude	   in	   a	  way	  of	   dress.	  Good	  clothes,	   usually,	   that	   you	   bought	   for	   life.	   The	   big	   heavy	   overcoat,	   good	  jacket,	  good	  breeches,	  leggings,	  then	  a	  cardigan,	  a	  waistcoat,	  a	  watchchain,	  and	  all	  of	   it	  open,	  as	  a	  rule,	  right	  down	  to	  the	  waist.	  Layers	  of	   it	  going	  in,	  and	  of	  course	  no	  collar.	  But	  standing	  up,	  quite	  open.	  They	  weren’t,	  really,	  people	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  inferiority.25	  ‘A	  whole	  attitude	  in	  a	  way	  of	  dress’,	  might	  be	  a	  useful	  way	  of	  locating	  structures	  of	  feeling	  within	  relays	  of	  material	  culture	  and	  social	  conventions	  that	  aren’t	  the	  usual	  evidential	  basis	  for	  social	  attitudes	  and	  structural	  sensitivities.	  Clothing	  or	  crockery	  or	  furniture	  are	  difficult	  to	  see	  as	  determining	  and	  sustaining	  carriers	  of	  feelings	  in	  themselves,	  which	  is	  why	  Williams	  treats	  them	  (as	  Benedict	  might)	  within	  a	   larger	  sense	  of	  practice	  and	  practical	  consciousness:	   it	   isn’t	  simply	  the	  wearing	  of	  a	  good	  quality	   jacket,	  waistcoat	   and	   cardigan;	   it	   is	   a	   certain	  practical	  bravura	   in	  wearing	  these	  in	  a	  way	  that	  wasn’t	  ‘buttoned	  up’	  (in	  both	  a	  literal	  sense	  and	  a	  metaphorical	  sense	  of	  not	  being	  tentative,	   inward,	  cagey).	  The	  modern	  sense	  of	   ‘having	  attitude’,	  meaning	   not	   being	   passive	   or	   compliant,	   is	   enacted	   in	   this	   example	   of	   garment	  wearing	  a	  century	  before	  the	  modern	  sense	  of	  the	  word	  attitude	  had	  currency.	  In	   the	   same	   discussion	   Williams	   mentions	   how	   his	   father	   had	   a	   feel	   for	  democratic	   practice,	   and	   that	   this	   disposition	   was	   the	   product	   of	   non-­‐conformist	  religious	  institutions	  (the	  tradition	  of	  attending	  chapel):	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Well,	   the	   self-­‐government	   tradition	   in	   the	   chapels	  disposed	  many	  people	  to	   democratic	   feeling;	   feeling,	   really,	   rather	   than	   thinking.	   Someone	   like	  my	   father	  who	  grew	  up	   in	  a	   farm	   labourer’s	   family,	  outside	   the	   tradition	  that	  brought	  conscious	  trade	  union	  attitudes,	  still	  got,	  I	  think,	  the	  feelings	  that	  matter.26	  	  For	   Williams	   a	   democratic	   feeling	   is	   a	   crucial	   aspect	   of	   a	   progressive	   cultural	  politics.	   And	   you	   can	   see	   a	   crucial	   aspect	   of	   the	  politics	   of	   a	   ‘structures	   of	   feeling’	  approach	  when	  you	  recognise	  that	  a	  democratic	   impulse	  might	  be	  more	   important	  as	   a	   feeling	   than	   as	   a	   thought,	   or	   rather	   unless	   it	   is	   lived	   as	   a	   felt-­‐thought,	   it	   can	  produce	   the	   gestures	   of	   an	   ersatz	   and	   empty	   impulse	   that	   results	   in	   democratic-­‐seeming	   phenomena	   like	   ‘staff	   satisfaction	   surveys’	   that	   instead	   of	   teaching	  democratic	  feelings,	  teach	  us	  how	  to	  submit	  to	  bureaucracy.	  In	   his	   analysis	   of	   the	   structures	   of	   feeling	   circulating	   in	  Britain	   in	   1960	   he	   is	  prescient	  in	  his	  sense	  of	  the	  way	  that	  a	  smokescreen	  of	  ‘consultation’	  and	  feedback	  is	  used	  to	  mask	  a	  savage	  authoritarianism:	  	  	  This	   is	   the	   real	   power	   of	   institutions,	   that	   they	   actively	   teach	   particular	  ways	  of	   feeling,	  and	   it	   is	  at	  once	  evident	   that	  we	  have	  not	  nearly	  enough	  institutions	  which	  practically	  teach	  democracy.	  The	  crucial	  area	  is	  in	  work,	  where	   in	  spite	  of	   limited	  experiments	   in	   ‘joint	  consultation’,	   the	  ordinary	  decision	   process	   is	   rooted	   in	   an	   exceptionally	   rigid	   and	   finely-­‐scaled	  hierarchy,	   to	   which	   the	   only	   possible	   ordinary	   responses,	   of	   the	   great	  majority	  of	  us	  who	  are	  in	  no	  position	  to	  share	  in	  decisions,	  are	  apathy,	  the	  making	  of	  respectful	  petitions,	  or	  revolt.27	  This	   aspect	   of	   an	   undemocratic	   ‘felt	   culture’	   is	   a	   crucial	   aspect	   of	   the	   structure	   of	  feeling	  of	  neoliberalism,	  where	  a	  constant	  demand	   to	   ‘feedback’	  and	   to	   ‘share	  best	  practice’	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  unconstrained	  submission	  to	  administration.28	  	  Structures	  of	   feeling,	  though,	  don’t	  have	  to	  have	  an	  explicit	  sociopolitical	   form	  such	  as	  a	  pathos	  towards	  suffering,	  or	  a	  submission	  to	  bureaucratic	  networks.	  They	  can	  also	  feature	  much	  more	  indefinite	  and	  diffuse	  sensual	  forms.	  Thus	  at	  the	  start	  of	  
The	   Country	   and	   the	   City	   from	  1973,	  Williams	   offers	   his	   own	   feelings	   towards	   the	  city	  and	  the	  country.	  The	  city	  for	  Williams	  is	  full	  of	  ambivalent	  feelings.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  city	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  progress:	  he	  has,	  he	  writes,	   ‘known	  this	  feeling’	  when	   ‘looking	  up	   at	   great	   buildings	   that	   are	   the	   centres	   of	   power’.	  On	   the	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other	   hand	   his	   overarching	   feeling	   towards	   the	   city	   is	   a	   ‘permanent	   feeling	   …	   of	  possibility,	   of	  meeting	   and	   of	  movement’.29	   A	   feeling	   of	   possibility	   strikes	  me	   as	   a	  very	  different	  kind	  of	  feeling	  from	  a	  ‘democratic’	  impulse,	  or	  a	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect.	  It	   suggests	   energy,	   a	   sense	   of	   a	   rhythm,	   an	   unknown	   form	   of	   practice	   that	   could	  erupt	  at	  any	  time.	  It	  sits	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  emergent,	  or	  the	  pre-­‐emergent,	  whereas	  the	   democratic	   feeling	   that	   his	   father	   had	   sat	   more	   precisely	   on	   the	   side	   of	   the	  residual,	   a	   form	   that	   was	   being	   steamrolled	   into	   oblivion	   by	   anonymous	  bureaucratic	  forms.	  In	  his	  description	  of	   feelings	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  country	  Williams	   is	  at	  his	  most	  evocative,	   describing	   not	   an	   idyll	   but	   a	   dense	   network	   of	   sensual	   triggers	   and	  conflicting	  sentiments:	  It	   is	   the	   elms,	   the	  may,	   the	  white	   horse,	   in	   the	   field	   beyond	   the	  window	  where	  I	  am	  writing.	   It	   is	  the	  men	  in	  the	  November	  evening,	  walking	  back	  from	  pruning,	  with	  their	  hands	  in	  the	  pockets	  of	  their	  khaki	  coats;	  and	  the	  women	  in	  headscarves,	  outside	  their	  cottages,	  waiting	  for	  the	  blue	  bus	  that	  will	  take	  them,	  inside	  school	  hours,	  to	  work	  in	  the	  harvest.	  It	  is	  the	  tractor	  on	   the	   road,	   leaving	   its	   tracks	   of	   serrated	   pressed	  mud;	   the	   light	   in	   the	  small	   hours,	   in	   the	   pig	   farm	   across	   the	   road,	   in	   the	   crisis	   of	   a	   litter;	   the	  slow	   brown	   van	   met	   at	   the	   difficult	   corner,	   with	   the	   crowded	   sheep	  jammed	  to	  its	  slatted	  sides;	  the	  heavy	  smell,	  on	  still	  evenings,	  of	  the	  silage	  ricks	  fed	  with	  molasses.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  sour	  land,	  on	  the	  thick	  boulder	  clay,	  not	   far	   up	   the	   road,	   that	   is	   selling	   for	   housing,	   for	   a	   speculative	  development,	  at	  twelve	  thousand	  pounds	  an	  acre.30	  Feelings	  can’t	  be	  contained	  by	  positive	  or	  negative	  evaluations,	  instead	  they	  exist	  in	  ‘whole	   ways	   of	   life’	   that	   feature	   speculative	   development	   alongside	   ‘women	   in	  headscarves’	   and	  men	  with	   ‘their	   hands	   in	   their	   pockets’.	   Attitudes	   clash,	   sensual	  forces	  connect	  the	  ‘heavy’	  smell	  of	  silage	  with	  the	  ‘sour’	  earth.	  This	  is	  a	  structure	  of	  feeling	  that	  is	  a	  feeling	  for	  community,	  and	  nature,	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  developers.	  But	   if	   structures	   of	   feeling	   can	   contain	   sensorial	   description	   and	   collective	  memory,	   if	   it	   can	   include	   bodily	   attitudes	   and	   ‘fellow	   feeling’,	   if	   it	   can	   register	  practical	   consciousness	   and	   material	   politics,	   is	   it	   just	   too	   vague	   a	   phrase	   to	   be	  useful?	   Is	   an	   approach	   to	   ‘structures	   of	   feeling’	   simply	   an	   invitation	   to	   register	  cultural	   forms	   beyond	   the	   ideational,	   beyond	   the	   ideological?	   Is	   it	   simply	   a	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provocation	   that	   petitions	   for	   fuller	   descriptions	   of	   our	   collective	   lives,	   lives	   lived	  across	   landscapes	   and	   cityscapes,	   across	   institutions	   and	   informal	   gatherings,	  among	  furniture	  and	  clothing,	  sounds	  and	  smells?	  
—THE NECESSITY OF VAGUENESS When	  Gregory	  Bateson	  started	  out	  with	  his	  New	  Guinea	   fieldwork	  he	  had	  a	  vague,	  but	  ambitious	  project	  in	  mind:	  I	  was	   especially	   interested	   in	   studying	  what	   I	   called	   the	   ‘feel’	   of	   culture,	  and	  I	  was	  bored	  with	  the	  conventional	  study	  of	  the	  more	  formal	  details.	  I	  went	  out	  to	  New	  Guinea	  with	  that	  much	  vaguely	  clear—and	  in	  one	  of	  my	  first	   letters	  home	  I	  complained	  of	   the	  hopelessness	  of	  putting	  any	  sort	  of	  salt	  on	   the	   tail	  of	   such	  an	   imponderable	   concept	  as	   the	   ‘feel’	   of	   culture.	   I	  had	   been	   watching	   a	   casual	   group	   of	   natives	   chewing	   betel,	   spitting,	  laughing,	  joking,	  etc.,	  and	  I	  felt	  acutely	  the	  tantalizing	  impossibility	  of	  what	  I	  wanted	  to	  do.31	  Analysis	   is	   left	   with	   spitting,	   laughing,	   joking,	   but	   the	   project	   is	   always	   of	  understanding	  how	  such	  practices	  are	  part	  of	  a	  whole	  way	  of	  life	  that	  has	  a	  distinct	  tonal	  range,	  a	  definite	  set	  of	  attitudes,	  of	  feelings,	  of	  moods	  and	  manners.	  Or	  at	  least	  the	  project	  is	  always	  attempting	  this	  understanding.	  For	  Bateson	  the	  word	   ‘feel’	  was	  crucial,	  not	  because	   it	  pointed	  to	  emotions	  or	  affects,	  or	  manners	  and	  attitudes,	  but	  because	  it	  didn’t	  really	  point	  anywhere	  at	  all.	  Bateson	   used	   words	   like	   ‘feel’,	   ‘stuff’	   and	   ‘bits’	   as	   placeholder	   words:	   ‘these	   brief	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  terms	  have	  for	  me	  a	  definite	  feeling-­‐tone	  which	  reminds	  me	  all	  the	  time	  that	   concepts	  behind	   them	  are	  vague	  and	  await	   analysis’.32	   In	  other	  words,	   one	  of	  the	  points	  of	  using	  a	  word	  like	  ‘feeling’	  rather	  than	  say	  ‘affect’	  would	  be	  that	  it	  was	  less	  able	  to	  determine	  the	  sorts	  of	  phenomena	  that	  it	  might	  uncover	  and	  disclose.	  In	  this	  we	  could	  say	  that	  ‘structures	  of	  feeling’	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  phrase	  that	  sought	  to	  attend	  to	  culture	  in	  solution	  rather	  than	  as	  precipitate,	  but	  that	  the	  phrase	  itself	  was	  designed	   to	   refuse,	   or	   at	   least	   delay,	   the	   sort	   of	   precipitation	   that	   results	   from	  analysis.	   For	   Bateson	   ‘feel’	   could	   only	   be	   a	   beginning,	   to	   be	   swapped	   for	   more	  complex	  and	  precise	  designations	  of	  cultural	  process.	  I	  think	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  Williams	  hung	  on	  to	  the	  phrase	  ‘structures	  of	  feeling’	  even	  though	  it	  was	  constantly	  critiqued	  (by	  people	  close	   to	  him)	   is	   that	   it	   sat	  on	   the	  side	  of	   the	  empirical,	  not	   in	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some	   naïve	   anti-­‐theoretical	   manner,	   but	   as	   part	   of	   a	   commitment	   to	   a	   radical	  empiricism	   that	   always	   moves	   towards	   the	   pulsing,	   populated	   world	   even	   if	   it	  recognises	   that	   there	   is	   no	   untroubled	   access	   to	   such	   a	   world.33	   In	   other	   words	  ‘structures	  of	   feeling’	  names	  a	   theoretical	   commitment	   to	   the	  priority	  of	  corporeal,	  telluric	  life.	  The	   path	   from	   ethos	   to	   ‘structures	   of	   feeling’,	   from	   Benedict	   and	   Bateson	   to	  Williams,	  is	  not	  a	  straightforward	  one	  and	  includes	  aspects	  of	  discontinuity	  as	  well	  as	   continuity.	   The	   continuity	   is	   evident	   when,	   for	   instance,	   Williams	   describes	  structures	   of	   feeling	   as	   ‘characteristic	   elements	   of	   impulse,	   restraint,	   and	   tone;	  specifically	   affective	   elements	   of	   consciousness	   and	   relationships:	   not	   feelings	  against	  thought,	  but	  thought	  as	  felt	  and	  feeling	  as	  thought:	  practical	  consciousness	  of	  a	   present	   kind,	   in	   a	   living	   relationship	   to	   continuity’;	   this	   has	   the	   same	   sense	   of	  knotted	  gestalt	  that	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Benedict	  and	  Bateson.34	  But	  there	  are	  also	  differences,	  and	  discontinuity.	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  Benedict	  and	  Bateson	  were	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  stabilities	  of	  cultural	  forms	  than	  in	  their	  radical	  mutability.	  When	  Benedict	  describes	  a	  cultural	  ethos	   as	   Apollonian	   or	   Dionysian	  what	   she	   has	   in	  mind	   is	   a	   distinct	   taxonomy	   of	  ‘emotional	   backgrounds’	   that	   could	   allow	   her	   to	   compare	   and	   contrast	   cultural	  forms	  (which	  would	  include	  critiquing	  the	  rivalry	  at	  the	  base	  of	  American	  capitalism	  as	  chronically	  ‘wasteful’).	  Bateson,	  who	  defines	  an	  ethos	  as	  ‘a	  culturally	  standardised	  
system	  of	  organisation	  of	  the	  instincts	  and	  emotions	  of	  the	  individuals’	  sees	  his	  project	  as	  uncovering	  a	  distinct	  typology	  of	  ethoses:	  The	   ethos	   of	   a	   given	   culture	   is	   as	   we	   shall	   see	   an	   abstraction	   from	   the	  whole	  mass	  of	   its	   institutions	  and	   formulations	  and	   it	  might	   therefore	  be	  expected	  that	  ethoses	  would	  be	  infinitely	  various	  from	  culture	  to	  culture—as	  various	  as	  the	   institutions	  themselves.	  Actually,	  however,	   it	   is	  possible	  that	  in	  this	  infinite	  variousness	  it	  is	  the	  content	  of	  affective	  life	  which	  alters	  from	   culture	   to	   culture,	   while	   underlying	   systems	   or	   ethoses	   are	  continually	   repeating	   themselves.	   It	   seems	   likely—a	   more	   definite	  statement	  would	  be	  premature—that	  we	  may	  ultimately	  be	  able	  to	  classify	  the	  types	  of	  ethos.35	  Williams	   does	   have	   some	   sense	   that,	   at	   least	   on	   one	   level,	   such	   large-­‐scale	  ‘structures	   of	   feeling’	   are	   indeed	   operative	   and	   can	   tell	   us	   something	   about	   the	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character	  of	   a	   society	   (its	   commitments	   to	   competitive	   individualism,	   for	   instance,	  or	   the	   structural	   dominance	   of	   a	   class	   system).36	   But	   in	   general	  Williams	   is	  much	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  sorts	  of	  incremental	  changes	  that	  gather	  around	  a	  generation,	  or	  a	  community,	  or	  a	  class.37	  When	  Williams	  returned	  to	  Cambridge	  University	  after	  spending	  the	  war	  in	  an	  artillery	  regiment	  he	  found	  that	  suddenly	  he	  didn’t	  ‘speak	  the	  same	  language’	  as	  the	  current	   crop	   of	   undergraduates	   and	   faculty.	   Six	   years	   earlier	   he	   had	   come	   to	  Cambridge	   from	   a	   working-­‐class	   family	   in	   Wales.	   He	   found	   he	   spoke	   a	   different	  language	   then	   as	   well.	   ‘Not	   speaking	   the	   same	   language’	   is	   the	   feeling	   that	  undergirds	  his	  Keywords	  project:	  When	  we	   come	   to	   say	   ‘we	   just	   don’t	   speak	   the	   same	   language’	  we	  mean	  something	   more	   general:	   that	   we	   have	   different	   immediate	   values	   or	  different	   kinds	   of	   valuation,	   or	   that	   we	   are	   aware,	   often	   intangibly,	   of	  different	  formations	  and	  distributions	  of	  energy	  and	  interest.38	  ‘Not	  speaking	  the	  same	  language’	  doesn’t	  rest	  on	  one	  or	  two	  words	  that	  have	  taken	  on	   new	   connotations,	   new	   accentuations;	   it	   rests	   on	   relays	   of	  words	   being	   pulled	  into	  new	  constellations,	  new	  ‘structures	  of	  feeling’.	  Describing	  a	  process	  of	  linguistic	  change	   where	   ‘certain	   words,	   tones	   and	   rhythms,	   meanings	   are	   offered,	   felt	   for,	  tested,	  confirmed,	  asserted,	  qualified,	  changed’,	  Williams’s	  Keywords	  project	  can	  be	  described	   as	   sociopolitical	   philology,	   registering	   changes	   in	   feelings	   via	   the	  reaccentuation	  of	  words	  within	  patterns	  of	  utterances.39	   Such	   relays	  of	  words	  had	  been	  fundamental	  to	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘culture’:	  ‘The	  words	  I	  linked	  it	  [culture]	  with,	  because	  of	   the	  problems	   its	  uses	   raised	   in	  my	  mind,	  were	  class	   and	  
art,	   and	   then	   industry	   and	   democracy.	   I	   could	   feel	   these	   five	   words	   as	   a	   kind	   of	  structure.’40	   If	   such	   a	   constellation	   could	  be	   seen	   as	   designating	   a	   ‘structure’	   for	   a	  ‘structure	   of	   feeling’	   then	  we	   could	   just	   as	   easily	   replace	   the	  word	   structure	  with	  either	  ‘relay’	  or	  ‘configuration’	  or	  ‘pattern’.	  Configurations	  of	  feeling	  are	  not	  carried	  by	  words	  alone.	  The	  material	  world	  of	  things	  undergoes	  all	  sorts	  of	  reaccentuation	  and	  reattunement.	  For	  instance	  the	  pine	  kitchen	   table,	  once	  only	   found	   in	  working-­‐class	  houses	  or	   in	   those	  kitchens	  where	  only	  servants	  worked,	  became	  in	  Britain	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  beyond	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  a	  more	   informal	  domesticity	   for	   the	   ‘new	  middle	  classes’	  who	  were	   also	   reaccentuating	   words	   like	   freedom,	   liberty	   and	   community,	   in	   new	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directions.	   And	   kitchen	   tables	   connected	   to	   other	   relays	   of	   clothes,	   music,	   food,	  chairs,	  greetings,	  names,	  books,	  forms	  of	  relaxation,	  sayings,	  and	  on	  and	  on	  and	  on.41	  They	  also	  disconnect:	  a	  second-­‐hand	  pine	  table	  is	  neither	  an	  oak	  dining	  table	  nor	  a	  Formica	   covered	   table.	   Williams	   prioritised	   language	   and	   dramatic	   forms	   as	   his	  documentary	  evidence	  of	  the	  past	  in	  his	  works	  of	   literary	  criticism:	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  feelings	  that	  he	  describes	  in	  his	  personal	  testimony	  we	  are	  shown	  a	  more	  physically	  sensual	  world	  of	  clothing	  and	  community,	  food	  and	  furnishings.	  In	   many	   ways	   the	   world	   of	   clothing	   and	   furnishings	   might	   offer	   a	   different	  sensitivity	   for	   registering	   changes	   in	   ‘structures	   of	   feeling’	   than	   that	   found	   in	  language	  and	  dramatic	  forms.42	  As	  Williams	  seems	  to	  suggest	  in	  Keywords	  semantic	  shifts	   and	   semantic	   struggles	   are	   usually	   slow,	   accumulating	   over	   decades	   and	  centuries.	  Clothing,	   food	  and	  furnishings,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  are	  much	  closer	  to	  the	  world	   of	   commerce,	   and	  much	  more	   sensitive	   to	   the	   vagaries	   of	   taste,	   as	   well	   as	  directing	   and	   giving	   form	   to	   such	   changing	   tastes.	   They	   are	   syncopated	   to	   much	  faster	   rhythms.	   Of	   course	   in	   some	  ways	   I’m	   setting	   up	   a	   false	   alterative	   here:	   the	  worlds	  of	  novels	  and	  films,	  for	  instance,	  rely	  heavily	  on	  conjuring	  mood	  and	  feeling	  precisely	   through	   their	   particular	   use	   of	   clothing,	   architecture,	   language,	  furnishings,	  food,	  and	  so	  on.	  Many	  of	  the	  most	  exciting	  writers	  in	  the	  current	  turn	  to	  affect	  are	  also	  literary	  critics	  who	  acknowledge	   their	  relationship	   to	  Williams’s	  concept.	  Some	  of	   the	  best	  work	   in	   this	   area	   recognises	   the	  way	  Williams’s	   project	  was	   purposefully	   open	   to	  include	  more	  phenomena	  than	  that	  covered	  by	  the	  terms	  emotion	  and	  affect.	  Sianne	  Ngai,	  for	  instance,	  has	  a	  wonderfully	  compendious	  grasp	  of	  the	  range	  and	  ambition	  of	  Williams’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  feeling:	  	  Williams	   is	   not	   analysing	   emotion	   or	   affect,	   but,	   rather,	   strategically	  mobilizing	   an	   entire	   register	   of	   felt	   phenomena	   in	   order	   to	   expand	   the	  existing	   domain	   and	  methods	   of	   social	   critique	   …	   His	   primary	   aim	   is	   to	  mobilize	   an	   entire	   affective	   register,	   in	   its	   entirety,	   and	   as	   a	   register,	   in	  order	   to	   enlarge	   the	   scope	   and	   definition	   of	  materialist	   analysis.	   This	   is	  something	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  goal	  of	  offering	  a	   ‘materialist	  analysis’	  of	  affect	  itself.43	  Such	  an	  assessment	  is	  based	  on	  the	  openness	  and	  vagueness	  of	  the	  term	  ‘feelings’.	  It	  is	  this	  openness	  that	  is	  important,	  and	  one	  way	  of	  continuing	  and	  extending	  its	  use	  is	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to	  direct	  it	  towards	  new	  object	  of	  attention.	  And	  this	  might	  mean	  reconnecting	  with	  its	   roots	   in	   anthropology	   and	   the	   social	   sciences	  more	   generally.	   I	   also	   think	   that	  those	  who	   study	  material	   culture	   and	   design	   could	   usefully	   employ	   ‘structures	   of	  feeling’	   to	  describe	   the	  energies	   and	   tones	   that	   attach	   to	  our	  material	  worlds.	  The	  path	  has	  already	  been	  laid,	   to	  some	  degree,	  by	  the	   likes	  of	  Kathleen	  Stewart	   in	  her	  eloquent	   and	   efflorescent	   descriptions	   of	   micro-­‐worlds	   taking	   place	   across	   the	  United	  States	  in	  small	  towns,	  and	  side	  streets.44	  Or	  in	  a	  very	  different	  vein	  by	  Ruth	  Wilson	  Gilmore’s	  insistent	  look	  at	  the	  ‘infrastructures	  of	  feeling’	  in	  the	  penal	  system	  in	  America.45	  In	   an	   essay	   from	  1975	  Raymond	  Williams	   imagines	  being	   asked	   the	  question	  ‘You’re	   a	  Marxist,	  Aren’t	  You?’	  The	   essay	  he	  writes	   is	   a	   reply	   to	   that	  question	   and	  involves	   his	   reflection	   on	  working	  with	   the	   Labour	   Party	   in	   the	   1930s	   and	   in	   the	  changes	   and	   challenges	   to	   progressive	   politics	   in	   the	   years	   following	   the	   end	   of	  World	  War	  II.	  He	  ends	  the	  essay	  by	  looking	  to	  the	  future	  and	  by	  connecting	  his	  form	  of	  cultural	  materialism	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  socialist	  politics:	  	  The	   task	   of	   a	   successful	   socialist	   movement	   will	   be	   one	   of	   feeling	   and	  imagination	  quite	  as	  much	  as	  one	  of	  fact	  and	  organisation.	  Not	  imagination	  or	  feeling	  in	  their	  weak	  senses—‘imagining	  the	  future’	  (which	  is	  a	  waste	  of	  time)	  or	   ‘the	  emotional	   side	  of	   things’.	  On	   the	  contrary,	  we	  have	   to	   learn	  and	  to	  teach	  each	  other	  the	  connections	  between	  a	  political	  and	  economic	  formation,	   a	   cultural	   and	   educational	   formation,	   and,	   perhaps	   hardest	   of	  all,	   the	   formations	   of	   feeling	   and	   relationship	   which	   are	   our	   immediate	  resources	  in	  any	  struggle.46	  The	  work	  around	  ‘structures	  of	  feelings’	  was	  never	  simply	  about	  doing	  better,	  fuller	  cultural	   history	   (though	   that	   is	   one	   of	   its	   generative	   effects);	   it	   was	   about	  understanding	   how	   change	   occurs,	   how	   social	   and	   cultural	   forms	   are	  maintained,	  and,	   perhaps	   most	   importantly	   of	   all,	   of	   locating	   what	   Williams	   referred	   to	   as	  ‘resources	  of	  hope’.	  	  One	  way	  of	  characterising	  Williams’s	  entire	  project	   is	   to	  see	   it	  as	  nursing	  and	  nurturing	   ‘resources	   of	   hope’	   for	   the	   struggle	   for	   socialism.	   It	   seems	   clear	   that	  structures	   and	   formations	   of	   feeling	   were	   such	   a	   resource	   and	   that	   they	   had	  something	   to	   do	   with	   relationships	   lived	   at	   an	   immediate	   level.	   Of	   course	   in	   any	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despondency’	   than	   of	   hope,	   or	   of	   feelings	   that	   block	   the	   path	   to	   socialism.	   The	  material	   world	   doesn’t	   provide	   any	   guaranteed	   ‘democratic	   tools’	   or	   ‘socialist	  objects’	  but	  it	  does	  name	  a	  world	  that	  has	  to	  sustain	  our	  daily	  lives,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  it	  carries	   and	   sustains	   worlds	   of	   feeling.	  We	   need	   to	   chart	   the	   relays	   of	   things	   and	  feelings	   that	   block	   the	   paths	   of	   our	   flourishing,	   just	   as	   we	   need	   to	   grasp	   hold	   of	  feelings	  and	  things	  that	  can,	  potentially	  at	  least,	  offer	  a	  more	  hopeful	  future.	  	   —	  	  Ben	   Highmore	   is	   Professor	   of	   Cultural	   Studies	   in	   the	   School	   of	   Media,	   Film	   and	  Music,	  University	  of	  Sussex,	  United	  Kingdom.	  His	  most	  recent	  books	  are	  Culture:	  Key	  
Ideas	   in	  Media	   and	   Cultural	   Studies	   (2016)	   and	  The	   Great	   Indoors:	   At	   Home	   in	   the	  
Modern	   British	   House	   (2014).	   His	   book	   The	   Art	   of	   Brutalism:	   Rescuing	   Hope	   from	  
Catastrophe	  in	  1950s	  Britain	  is	  forthcoming	  from	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
—NOTES 1	  See	  Patricia	  T.	  Clough	  (ed.),	  The	  Affective	  Turn:	  Theorizing	  the	  Social,	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  Durham,	  2007.	  As	  for	  the	  criticism	  the	  term	  has	  solicited,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  emphatic	  critical	  statements	  comes	  from	  Stuart	  Hall,	  who	  writes:	  ‘this	  confusion,	  which	  persists	  in	  Williams’s	  later	  work,	  is	  predicated	  on	  an	  uninspected	  notion	  of	  “experience”	  which,	  in	  the	  earlier	  work,	  produced	  the	  quite	  unsatisfactory	  concept	  of	  “a	  structure	  of	  feeling”	  and	  which	  continues	  to	  have	  disabling	  theoretical	  effects’,	  Stuart	  Hall,	  ‘Politics	  and	  Letters’,	  in	  Terry	  Eagleton	  (ed.),	  Raymond	  Williams:	  Critical	  Perspectives,	  Polity	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  1989,	  p.	  62.	  Stuart	  Hall	  didn’t	  always	  have	  this	  opinion	  and	  had	  previously	  used	  Williams’s	  term	  as	  an	  explanatory	  phrase	  for	  describing	  the	  work	  of	  the	  illustrated	  magazine	  Picture	  Post;	  Stuart	  Hall,	  ‘The	  Social	  Eye	  of	  Picture	  Post’,	  in	  Working	  Papers	  in	  Cultural	  Studies	  2,	  University	  of	  Birmingham,	  1972,	  pp.	  71–120.	  2	  Though	  postwar	  British	  society	  provides	  the	  specific	  case	  study,	  the	  project	  I’m	  describing	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  questions	  of	  national	  culture.	  Indeed	  one	  aspect	  of	  cultural	  change	  in	  Britain	  could	  be	  described	  as	  something	  like	  a	  ‘becoming-­‐Mediterranean’	  for	  a	  particular	  class	  formation.	  The	  loosening	  of	  social	  strictures	  and	  the	  general	  rise	  of	  informality	  that	  occurs	  in	  Britain	  during	  this	  period	  also	  occurs	  in	  many	  other	  countries.	  Which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  I	  hope	  these	  thoughts	  are	  of	  interest	  to	  people	  who	  aren’t	  particularly	  interested	  in	  British	  history.	  I	  am	  keen	  that	  my	  case	  study	  is	  seen	  as	  just	  one	  provincial	  example	  among	  others,	  and	  that	  if	  it	  has	  relevance	  outside	  its	  case	  study	  it	  is	  because	  it	  tries	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  to	  describe	  some	  of	  the	  material	  processes	  and	  forms	  of	  the	  settlements	  and	  unsettlements	  that	  class	  cultures	  can	  make.	  3	  ‘Lifestyle’	  was	  a	  critical	  sociological	  and	  cultural	  concept	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  primarily	  associated	  with	  critical	  explorations	  of	  consumer	  culture.	  Other	  authors,	  though,	  have	  used	  the	  term	  more	  fulsomely	  as	  a	  way	  of	  opening	  up	  the	  empirical	  world	  to	  social	  aesthetic	  concerns.	  For	  instance	  the	  French	  philosopher	  and	  sociologist	  Henri	  Lefebvre	  often	  used	  the	  term	  ‘style’	  to	  describe	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  a	  ‘whole	  form	  of	  life’	  (often	  associated	  with	  pre-­‐modern	  rural	  living)	  to	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  fragmentation	  and	  atomisation	  of	  modern	  forms	  of	  everyday	  life	  under	  chronically	  advancing	  capitalism,	  which	  for	  Lefebvre	  lacked	  a	  coherent	  style.	  Art	  historical	  enquiry	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  century	  similarly	  used	  the	  term	  ‘style’	  as	  a	  way	  of	  connecting	  formal	  concerns	  in	  art	  and	  decoration	  with	  a	  more	  general	  living	  worldview.	  In	  my	  work	  I	  follow	  Lefebvre’s	  linkage	  of	  style	  and	  everyday	  life,	  but	  without	  the	  nostalgia	  for	  a prelapsarian	  rural	  idyll,	  and	  recognising	  the	  stylistics	  of	  fragmentation.	  	  4	  For	  a	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  affect	  theory	  and	  an	  argument	  about	  its	  most	  productive	  aspects	  for	  the	  social	  sciences	  see	  Margaret	  Wetherell,	  Affect	  and	  Emotion:	  A	  New	  Social	  Science	  Understanding,	  Sage,	  London,	  2012.	  For	  a	  collection	  of	  essays	  that	  explores	  different	  aspects	  of	  affect	  theory,	  see	  Melissa	  Gregg	  and	  Gregory	  J.	  Seigworth	  (eds),	  The	  Affect	  Theory	  Reader,	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  Durham,	  2010.	  For	  a	  useful	  intervention	  in	  the	  field	  of	  affect	  theory,	  see	  Clare	  Hemmings,	  ‘Invoking	  Affect:	  Cultural	  Theory	  and	  the	  Ontological	  Turn’,	  Cultural	  Studies,	  vol.	  19,	  no.	  5,	  2005,	  pp.	  548–67.	  doi:	  10.1080/09502380500365473.	  5	  Paul	  Filmer,	  ‘Structures	  of	  Feeling	  and	  Social-­‐cultural	  Formations:	  The	  Significance	  of	  Literature	  and	  Experience	  to	  Raymond	  Williams’s	  Sociology	  of	  Culture’,	  British	  Journal	  of	  Sociology,	  vol.	  54,	  no.	  2,	  2003,	  p.	  201.	  doi:	  10.1080/0007131032000080203.	  6	  These	  clarifying	  tools	  are	  most	  succinctly	  introduced	  in	  his	  New	  Left	  Review	  essay	  from	  1973,	  ‘Base	  and	  Superstructure	  in	  Marxist	  Cultural	  Theory’,	  reproduced	  in	  Problems	  in	  Materialism	  and	  Culture,	  Verso,	  London,	  1980,	  pp.	  31–49,	  and	  further	  elaborated	  in	  Marxism	  and	  Literature,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford,	  1977.	  7	  Raymond	  Williams	  and	  Michael	  Orrom,	  Preface	  to	  Film,	  Film	  Drama,	  London,	  1954.	  While	  the	  book	  is	  co-­‐authored	  it	  was	  made	  up	  of	  two	  distinct	  parts.	  The	  first	  part	  ‘Film	  and	  the	  Dramatic	  Tradition’	  was	  written	  by	  Williams,	  and	  ‘Film	  and	  its	  Dramatic	  Techniques’	  by	  Orrom.	  8	  Williams	  and	  Orrom,	  p.	  21.	  9	  Ibid.	  See	  Williams’s	  Marxism	  and	  Literature,	  pp.	  133–4	  for	  the	  same	  formulation	  twenty-­‐three	  years	  later.	  	  10	  Williams	  and	  Orrom,	  pp.	  21–2.	  At	  roughly	  the	  same	  time	  Henri	  Lefebvre	  could	  write	  a	  similar	  definition	  of	  everyday	  life:	  ‘Everyday	  life,	  in	  a	  sense	  residual,	  defined	  by	  “what	  is	  left	  over”	  after	  all	  distinct,	  superior,	  specialised,	  structured	  activities	  have	  been	  singled	  out	  by	  analysis,	  must	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  totality’;	  Henri	  Lefebvre,	  ‘Foreword’,	  Critique	  of	  Everyday	  Life:	  Volume	  1,	  translated	  by	  John	  Moore,	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  Verso,	  London,	  1991,	  p.	  97.	  The	  foreword	  is	  to	  the	  second	  edition,	  first	  published	  in	  France	  in	  1958.	  A	  similar	  sense	  of	  everyday	  life	  as	  something	  that	  often	  gets	  remaindered	  by	  the	  social	  investigation	  designed	  to	  apprehend	  it	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  Michel	  de	  Certeau’s	  The	  Practice	  of	  Everyday	  Life,	  trans.	  Steven	  Rendall,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  Berkeley,	  1984.	  Thus	  we	  could	  suggest	  that,	  on	  one	  level	  at	  least,	  there	  is	  a	  family	  resemblance	  between	  the	  terms	  ‘structures	  of	  feeling’	  and	  ‘everyday	  life’.	  11	  Williams	  and	  Orrom,	  p.	  23.	  12	  This	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  artworks	  are	  simply	  reflections	  of	  lively	  feeling,	  they	  are	  also,	  for	  Williams,	  the	  conveyors	  of	  feelings:	  ‘the	  new	  work	  will	  not	  only	  make	  explicit	  the	  changes	  in	  feeling,	  but	  will	  in	  itself	  promote	  and	  affect	  them’;	  Williams	  and	  Orrom,	  p.	  24.	  13	  Though	  Williams	  uses	  the	  phrase	  ‘a	  whole	  way	  of	  life’	  throughout	  his	  early	  work,	  it	  is	  given	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